There were a number of cases put before the Tribunals and courts regarding the sole or main residence of seamen especially merchant seamen.
The Anderton case was the test case in which the Seamen's Union placed its hope on finding that its members would not be liable for Community Charge whilst away at sea.
Mr. Anderton's circumstances were that he was a merchant seaman who was away from home for a considerable period - during 1988/89 275 days.
He was shown as resident on the canvass form that was completed on the commencement of the Community Charge legislation.
He spent his leave time at his home in which he lived with his wife. His wife remained resident while he was away. Initially the Valuation Tribunal allowed his appeal on the grounds that he spent 75% of his time away from home.
In the case presented by the Council it was only supposed that while he was away that the majority of his belongings were kept at his home address.
Other cases were also put forward by the Council were held to not be applicable as they related to different legislation. The Tribunal did not accept the Councils argument that "residence" was the same as a persons "home".
The C.C.R.O appealed and eventually the High Court heard the case on 14th February 1991.
The High Court reversed the Tribunal's decision on the following grounds;
1. A merchant ship plying the high seas could not constitute a place of residence.
2. Even if a ship could be considered a persons residence, a number of previous (non-community charge) cases established that the appellants sole or main residence is his home.
3. The Tribunal erred in its decision to confine its attention exclusively to time.
4. The Tribunal erred in its decision to disregard the case of Frost v Feltham
5. If the Tribunal had considered the other details it would have confirmed the appellants sole or main residence was his house and not the ship.
This was an appeal against a personal charge with effect from April 1990.
Mr. Ward's contention was that his sole or main residence was in Saudi Arabia and not Hull.
The Tribunal determined that his sole or main residence was in this country.
Mr. and Mrs. Ward who purchased it in 1983 jointly owned the property. Shortly before that time Mr. Ward was employed by British Aerospace at its base in Dhahran.
He worked and lived there between 1982 to 1987, from 1987 to 1989 he worked for a few employers in Hull and was unemployed for a short time. In 1989 he returned to work for British Aerospace in Dhahran and still worked there at the time of the hearing.
Throughout Mr. Ward's employment Mrs. Ward has continued to live in Hull.
Mr. Ward returned to the matrimonial home during leave periods totalling 6 to 9 weeks per year. His contract of employment was specifically for employment in Saudi Arabia and accommodation was provided for him there.
Under the terms of his contract he could after a period of three months, subject to married quarters being available, take out his wife and family.
The Wards had planned to do this at some time. The evidence given by Mr. Ward was extensive and incorporated all the facts including that of Mr. Ward's personal possessions being with him in Saudi Arabia.
Ward maintained that he considered his home to be in Saudi and that he visited his UK address for holidays only.
A number of cases were put before the Tribunal by the C.C.R.O namely;
Bradford v Anderton.
Frost v Feltham
The Tribunals decision was that the Anderton case had very little relevance with the case and held that Mr. Ward's sole or main residence was in Saudi Arabia and not in Hull. A request was made to have the matter re-heard, which was granted. This time the Tribunal found in favour of the C.C.R.O.
The reason for changing its decision was that a note had been put before the tribunal indicating that Mr. Ward would be prepared to pay a percentage if necessary. The other reason for changing its mind was that Mr. Ward had security of tenure at his Hull address but not at his Saudi address.
After hearing the evidence in full as presented by counsel for Mr. Ward and Hull Council Mr. Justice Auld of the High Court dismissed Mr. Ward's appeal and awarded costs against him.
[Appeal from valuation and community charge tribunaL] LIABILITY - TWO DWELLINGS - MAIN RESIDENCE
The appellant in this case was a barrister who worked in London for a period of time but whose family home was in Wiltshire. He was registered for the purposes of community charge as being resident at the Wiltshire address, and he appealed to the valuation and community charge tribunal against that decision by the council's community charges registration officer.
The chargepayer initially lived, with his wife, in a flat in London, but they then bought the house in Wiltshire in August 1990. His wife and children moved to their new home at that time, but he remained at the London flat during the week and only went to Wiltshire for the weekends. He estimated that he spent 70% of each week at the London flat.
The appeal to the tribunal concerned the question of whether the house in Wiltshire was the chargepayer's main residence during the relevant time, and the tribunal ultimately upheld the decision of the registration officer that it was. The period in question was from August 1990 to 31 st March 1991, since the appellant eventually gave up his London flat and commenced to practice from his home in Wiltshire,
The chargepayer appealed to the High Court on the basis that the tribunal erred in law because they had had regard to irrelevant factors, namely the situation of his wife and children, and that the only consideration that should have been taken account of was the proportion of time spent by the appellant in the subject property.
In the High Court, the judgment of Hutchinson J in Bradford Metropolitan City Council v Anderton [1991) [see this section] was emphasised, in which it was said that the tribunal on that occasion was in error because it had confined its attention, almost exclusively, to the question of time.
Laws J, in the present case, said that in his judgment it was beyond contention that the question of a person's main residence was not to be determined purely by reference to the amount of time spent there. He said that the tribunal plainly addressed the issue by considering what, in substance, was the chargepayer's home, what was the place to which he returned whenever possible, and how strong were his links with that place.
It was concluded that all the factors which should have been taken account of by the tribunal were relevant factors, particularly the residence of the family in the house in Wiltshire and the appellant's part ownership of it. The appeal was, consequently, dismissed.
It was determined by the valuation and community charge tribunal in this case that the chargepayer's name should be removed from the personal community charges register for the area of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, with effect from 1 st April 199O, on the basis that his main residence was in Poole. The chargepayer appealed to the High Court against that decision.
The circumstances were that the chargepayer lived in a flat in Kensington during the week, while working in London, but he also spent time at weekends, with his wife and young child, at the family home in Poole. He was the owner of both dwellings.
The chargepayer said that he spent "at least five days and five nights every week" at his Kensington flat. On appeal, he submitted that the finding of the tribunal that he spent most weekends at the property in Poole was a "non-decisive point" in determining where his main residence was.
In dismissing the appeal, Turner J said that, in the absence of any evidence to show that there was some special or unusual feature in connection with the relationship between the chargepayer and his wife and child, the tribunal was able to draw the inference, as it did, that it may reasonably be presumed that the place where the wife and child of a person permanently reside would be regarded as the main residence of the husband.
Nourse J presiding:
The case involved the question of loan interest relief from taxation to which a taxpayer was entitled only in respect of his only or main residence.
In this case a couple lived most of their time in a tenanted public house in Essex but owned the freehold of a house in Wales.
Their contention was that although they spent most of their time in the public house and only visited. The house in Wales some time each month, their main residence was the public house.
The judge held that a most important factor was the security of tenure aspect and held that the house in Wales was their main residence.
This case looked at the definition of residence where a person spent a limited time in the UK
This case concerned a ship's captain who spent the greater part of a year away from the UK. He had a house in Glasgow, which was held to be his residence.
" He goes on board not as a residence but for the purposes of his trade"
A case concerning a merchant navy Captain who was absent for the whole year.
He was found to still be resident in the UK even though his business kept him away.
This case concerned the entitlement of foreign students to grants under the Education Acts.
" A person must be habitually or normally resident in the UK apart from temporary absence of either short or long duration."
The valuation tribunal upheld the appeal, finding that Corporal Stark was not resident in the property and that his main residence, at least, was in the accommodation provided by the Royal Air Force. The tribunal allowed the discount, and the billing authority appealed to the High Court.
In the High Court, it was accepted that the property in question was jointly owned by the two parties and that Corporal Stark was also provided with accommodation (at the time] at a nearby air base. His commanding officer had provided a statement to the effect that he considered Corporal Stark's main residence to be in his service accommodation, and it was emphasised that Corporal Stark was not permitted to commute between the base in Lincolnshire and the dwelling in Doncaster.
Corporal Stark, in his submission, said that all of the bills relating to the dwelling were in his wife's name, and that the address for his car tax, car registration and driving licence were that of his RAF accommodation. Further, he said, he paid council tax, by deduction from wages, for his service accommodation.
It was conceded by Corporal Stark that he stayed in the house with his wife when he was on leave, and that he would return to that address if he were to leave the RAF. He said, however, that his contract had a further 11 years to run, that it could be extended in the event of his being promoted, and that the question of his leaving the service did not, thus, arise.
The reasons given by the valuation tribunal for allowing the appeal indicated that case law on the question of 'sole or main residence' deriving from t he former community charge legislation had been considered but had been judged to not be applicable to the present case. Further, the tribunal attached weight to the information provided by Corporal Stark and his commanding officer, and concluded that, though the RAF accommodation might not be his sole residence, "all the evidence pointed to it being his main residence".
Potts J considered that the tribunal was wrong to proceed on the basis that previous judgments of the courts on the question of 'sole or main residence' were not applicable. He found that the approach and principles identified by Hutchinson J in Bradford Metropolitan City Council v Anderton (1991] [see this section], and followed in Ward v Kingston upon Hull City Council (1993], Cox v London (South West] Valuation and Community Charge Tribunal and Poole Borough Council Community Charge Registration Officer 1994 and Codner v Wiltshire Valuation and Community Charge Tribunal (1994] [all this section], governed the approach of the High Court in the present appeal.
LIABILITY - TWO DWELLINGS - SOLE OR MAIN RESIDENCE - QUESTION OF FACT AND DEGREE - SURVEILLANCE EVIDENCE
This case arose from the decision of the valuation tribunal that the main residence of Miss M was in the dwelling owned by Mr C, and that Mr C was not, in consequence, the only person resident in that property. The tribunal's decision was based upon evidence, given by the billing authority, which showed Miss M to have been seen leaving Mr C's property on a number of occasions, and upon information that personal possessions of hers were kept there, that she had a financial interest in the property, and that there was a record of a conversation in which Mr C had said that Miss M lived there.
Each of the two parties owned a dwelling, Miss M's property being a mile or so away from that owned by Mr C. Between April 1995 and October 1995, the billing authority believed that Miss M resided in the property she owned, and they allowed a 25% discount against her council tax on the basis that she lived alone. Mr C was also receiving a 25% discount on his property, since it was believed that no one resided with him.
The High Court held that the valuation tribunal was entitled to make the finding it did, and that it was entitled to reject the appellants' evidence, in particular that suggesting that Miss M collected her car from Mr C's property every morning. Other photographic evidence, showing Miss M to have been at one property or the other at various times, was made available to the High Court, this not having been disclosed either to the appellants or the valuation tribunal, but Scott Baker J considered this to be neutral in its effect upon the case and rej ected the appellants' argument that they had been prejudiced by its having been withheld.
The High Court accepted that it was a fair inference from the evidence that Miss M was sleeping regularly at Mr C's property and that such a habit was a pointer to that property being, if not her sole residence, then at least her main residence. Further, he rejected the submission for the appellants that the tribunal had misled itself by leaving out of account factors relating to Miss M's property, such as her security of tenure there, her voting registration at that address, her registration there with her medical practitioner, and her own evidence that that was, in fact, where she really lived.
The final point dealt with in the High Court was the question of whether the appellants were prejudiced by information given to the tribunal by the council's officer regarding the possibility of the matter being referred to the police on the basis that false information had been given and that there was evidence of dishonesty. The court was not satisfied that the complaint that the appellants did not get a fair hearing had been made out, and Scott Baker J said that he did not think that there was any substance at all in the suggestion that, because of the observation of the council's officer, the tribunal took "as it were, an instant dislike to the appellants and refused to give consideration to the points that were being advanced on their behalf".
It was concluded that there were no grounds for interfering with the decision of the valuation tribunal, and the appeals were dismissed.
LIABILITY - SOLE OR MAIN RESIDENCE - OCCUPANT ABROAD FOR PERIOD OF FIVE MONTHS - WHETHER DWELLING FURNISHED OR UNFURNISHED NOT AN ISSUE - UNOCCUPANCY FOR TEMPORARY PERIOD OF TIME NOT HAVING EFFECT OF CHANGING RESIDENCE
This was an appeal against the decision of the valuation tribunal that a person was liable for council tax as the resident of a first floor flat which he held on a long lease but which, for a period, he did not live in. He first sought a review of that decision by the valuation tribunal but, when that was refused, he appealed to the High Court.
The appellant notified the billing authority that he was intending to live abroad from 1 st February 2000 for a period of four months. Subsequently, in March 2000, his father advised that the flat had been left unfurnished and that his son would be absent for a period of eight months, though his absence actually ended on 12th July 2000. It was indicated that the majority of the appellant's possessions were, during this time, located at his parents' home.
The billing authority arranged for the property to be inspected and formed the view that there was furniture on the premises and that they were to be treated as being occupied. The question of the furniture was never satisfactorily resolved however, the appellant maintaining throughout that the furniture had been removed.
Before the High Court, the appellant accepted that he would be liable for council tax as falling within the 'hierarchy of liability', as set down in section 6(1) and (2J!b] of the 1992 Act [see above], if it were to be determined that the property was his sole or main residence, He submitted, however, that he was not resident during the period of just over five months that he was abroad.
The billing authority took the view that the appellant was resident during this time because he had security of tenure in the flat and because the property continued to be available to him should he return from abroad. It was argued that the authority's position was supported by the decisions of the High Court in the community charge cases of Bradford Metropolitan City Council v Anderton (19911 and Ward v Kingston upon Hull City Council (1993] [see this section for both of these cases].
Elias J emphasised that the High Court could only interfere in the decision of a valuation tribunal if a clear error of law had been made, and he said that the question to be resolved in this case was whether the tribunal could properly have reached, on the evidence, the decision that the flat was the appellant's sole or main residence. He went on to say that "not only did the evidence support that, but it would have been extremely difficult for them to have reached any other conclusion".
LIABILITY OF OWNERS - HOUSE IN MULTIPLE OCCUPATION - LOCKS ON INTERNAL DOORS - CONSTRUCTED/ADAPTED FOR OTHER THAN SINGLE HOUSEHOLD
This case proceeded, on a question of law, from the valuation tribunal to the High Court, and then, as a further appeal, to the Court of Appeal. The judgments of the High Court and the Court of Appeal are summarised below.
This case concerned a dwelling which the valuation tribunal held was within Class C of the Liability for Owners regulations. The effect of that decision was that liability fell upon the owner [as defined in section 6(5) of the 1992 Act] rather than by being determined by reference to the hierarchy of liability provided for in section 6 of the Act.
The property had been let to a group of students for a fixed term of one year from 24th July 1994. The dwelling, being occupied wholly by students, was initially an exempt dwelling by virtue of Class N of the Council Tax [Exempt Dwellings] Order 1992 [511992/558], but one of the occupants subsequently ceased to be a student. and the council tax liability was restored from that time.
The billing authority concluded that the property was within Class C of the Liability for Owners regulations in the years 1994-95 and 1995-96, and it duly levied the tax upon the owner. At appeal, the valuation tribunal upheld the billing authority's decision in respect of the two periods, the first of these being a time when both of the conditions at [a! and (b! in Class C needed to be satisfied, and the second being a time when only one or the other needed to be met.
In notifying its decision to the owner of the property, the tribunal failed to provide a statement of reasons. In subsequent correspondence with the clerk to the tribunal, however, the owner's solicitors were told that the decision was made on the basis that there were locks on the doors within the property and that, in the opinion of the tribunal, the property was "then constructed or adapted for occupation by persons who do not constitute a single household".
At appeal before the High Court, Dyson J took the view that, so far as the second year was concerned [i.e. the year when either of paragraphs [a! or [b) had to be met], the test at paragraph [a! applied to dwellings which are suitable for occupation by persons who do not constitute a single household, whether by reason of their original construction or subsequent adaptation, or by a combination of the two. The aim of Class C, he said, was to render owners liable in respect of a state of affairs that obtains at the time the question of liability arose.
The argument made for the owner, that there needed to be consid eration of whether the original construction or any subsequent adaptation was carried out with the intention that there should be occupation by persons who do not constitute a single household, was rejected by the High Court.
Dyson J said that there was nothing in the statement provided by the tribunal to indicate that it had applied a test, for the second year, other than that which was required under paragraph (a! of Class C. He referred to the reliance placed by the billing authority on other matters, such as the fact that at least four of the tenants had been assigned individual rooms and that their mode of living did not constitute a single household, but he was satisfied from the tribunal's reasons that it had not applied the wrong test.
The appellant's second contention was that no reasonable tribunal could have decided that the test was satisfied on the basis of the locks alone, but Dyson J found that the tribunal was entitled to conclude that, having regard to the presence of security locks on the doors, the property was suitable for multiple occupation. He said "It is obvious that the presence of locks on internal doors is capable of pointing towards multi-occupation and away from a single household-,
The High Court found that there was no error of law in the decision of the valuation tribunal insofar as it related to the second year. The owner was consequently found to be liable for that year, and the appeal in that respect was dismissed.
With regard to the first year, during which both of paragraphs (a] and (b] needed to be satisfied for the property to fall within Class C, the High Court found that the tribunal had given no reasons at all which related to paragraph (bl. It was said that it was, therefore, impossible to tell whether the tribunal had directed itself correctly.
Dyson J thought it unlikely that the tribunal would, now, be able to furnish reasons for consideration by the High Court, and he consequently quashed the decision in relation to the first year and remitted this aspect of the case to the tribunal for reconsideration.
The owner of the property appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court with regard to the second of the two years in question . Before the Court of Appeal, counsel for the appellant submitted that the provision of locks to the internal doors would not, in reality, constitute a sufficient adaptation of the premises because it did not physically alter them.
The court was referred to a number of cases not concerned with local taxation which dealt with the expression 'constructed or adapted', but Kennedy LJ found that none of these were of assistance to the appellant's argument, because the fact was that, so far as could be ascertained, the tribunal had applied its mind to the question of whether or not the provision of locks could properly be described as an 'alteration'.
Kennedy LJ expressed himself to be satisfied that the billing authority had properly concluded that the property, not having been originally constructed for occupation by persons not constituting a single household, had been subsequently adapted for that purpose by the provision of internal locks, and he said that he could not find that conclusion to have been perverse.
The appeal was dismissed.
LIABILITY OF OWNERS - 'HOUSES IN MULTIPLE OCCUPATION' - EXCLUSIVITY SHARING AGREEMENTS - NO LIABILITY FOR RENT OR FEE FOR OTHER SHARE
The subject property in this case was a small two-bed roomed house owned by the appellants, Mr and Mrs Norris, which was initially occupied under two separate agreements by a Miss Walker and a Mr Moore. Each of these occupants was given, under their agreement, exclusive possession of one room and shared possession, with the other, of the remainder of the accommodation, and Miss Walker's agreement specified that this remainder was to be shared with "a second assured shorthold tenant of the tenant's choice, subject to the landlord's approval".
Mr Moore subsequently terminated his agreement and left the property, and there then followed some periods when Miss Walker remained in occupation on her own and other periods when one individual or another moved in, again under agreements with the owners. The terms of these agreements, however, apparently differed from those in the original agreements to the extent that they contained no provision as to exclusive use of parts of the house.
It was the decision of the billing authority that the property fell within Class C of the Council Tax [Liability for Owners] Regulations 1992 [see above] as a 'house in multiple occupation', such that the owners would be liable for the council tax rather than the individual residents. The owners appealed, and they asserted before the valuation tribunal that because of the size and nature of the property any persons living there would have to be friends, and that the occupants had full control of the property. There were said to be no locks on the internal doors, and the heating and water controls were situated in one of the bedrooms.
The argument before the valuation tribunal raised issues as to whether paragraphs [b] iii or [b] [ii] in Class C applied, and the tribunal found that the latter applied but the former did not. The tribunal made reference in its findings to the situation within the property actually being somewhat different from that described in the agreements, and it found that the various occupants all appeared to be friends and that there was little to prevent them moving freely within the whole house.
The valuation tribunal considered that there was evidence to support the conclusion that paragraph [b] [ii] in Class C applied because the agreements that existed between the owners and the various occupants amounted to licences to occupy. It was consequently determined that the property fell within that class and that the appellant owners were liable for the council tax.
At further appeal before the High Court, Newman J took the view that the occupants who moved in after Mr Moore left, whilst not having exclusivity to a particular bedroom, were nevertheless, in accordance with their agreements, sharing the whole property. He found that each of them paid a rent or a fee for their right to share, and that they were not liable for the rent or fee of any other share.
It was submitted for the owners that these occupants were joint tenants or, alternatively, that if they were not joint tenants then any occupier sharing with Miss Walker was either her sub-tenant or a lodger. Thus, it was argued. there had been, at all material times, some legal position prevailing other than a licence to occupy within the meaning of paragraph [bl [ii] of Class C.
Newman J said that at the forefront of the owners' argument was the contention that they had no control over Miss Walker's choice of a "sharing occupant". He questioned this assertion, however, and said that once the issue of exclusivity was taken out of the agreement there still remained a sharing agreement which provided that Miss Walker's occupancy was to be shared with that of a second party of her choice, but subject to the landlord's approval.
Newman J said it was plainly not right to suggest that anyone who occupied after Mr Moore, or for that matter Mr Moore himself, occupied by virtue of any grant from Miss Walker, since each had his or her separate agreement with the owners. He added that it could not possibly be contended that Miss Walker was, as a matter of Law, a joint tenant of the whole property with whoever joined her from time to time.
Newman J emphasised that when Miss Walker occupied on her own, she only had to pay her contribution to the rent or fee, because she only had a right to share the property with another, and he concluded that the internal arrangements reached by each occupant, one with the other, as to how they shared the property did not affect the term or operation of the agreements.
The owners' appeal against the decision of the valuation tribunal was dismissed.
LIABILITY OF OWNERS - HOUSE IN MULTIPLE OCCUPATION - REQUIREMENT TO SATISFY BOTH OF TWO CONDITIONS (UNTil 1st APRIL 1995) - KEY TO EACH ROOM NOT SIGNIFICANT - MEANING OF 'ORIGINALLY CONSTRUCTED OR SUBSEQUENTLY ADAPTED'
The appeal property was a dwelling house in which individual rooms were let out to various tenants during the period 1 st May 1993 to 31st March 1995. Each tenant had a separate agreement permitting exclusive use of one room and shared use of the bathroom, w.c. and kitchen.
It was acknowledged that the law relating to the liability of owners for properties in multiple occupation changed on 1 st April 1995, and there was no dispute about the fact that the owner was liable from that date. The billing authority, however, considered the owner to be liable for the periods before 1 st April 1995, and it levied council tax upon him, rather than upon the residents, on the basis that the property fell within Class C in regulation 2 of the Council Tax [Liability for Owners] Regulations 1992 [see above].
The owner appealed against that determination, but the valuation tribunal upheld the authority's view and cited the following as its reasons
" u- the tribunal paid considerable attention to the fact that the tenants do not constitute a single household, they have exclusive use of one room for which they have keys. They have separate tenancy agreements and do not have to make up any shortfall of rent. The tribunal therefore decides that the billing authority has correctly recognised [the property] as a 'house in multiple occupation' from the commencement of council tax and as such has correctly recognised the landlord as the liable person and not the tenants themselves".
At further appeal before the High Court, Collins J observed that the valuation tribunal had clearly relied upon the provision at !bl in Class C in regulation 2 of the 1992 Regulations [i.e. that the tenants were tenants of only part of the dwelling and were not liable to pay rent in respect of the whole], but he said that there was no indication, other than the reference to there being keys for each room, that the condition in Class C had been considered or satisfied.
Collins J considered that the fact that there were keys to each of the rooms was not particularly significant, and that this did not show that there had been any physical adaptation of the premises, such as was required by the condition in Class 2. Further, he looked at the meaning of the expression' originally constructed or subsequently adapted' and, after reviewing similar terms in other contexts, concluded that the word 'adapted' "must involve some sort of alteration to make the premises apt, because they were not originally constructed for that purpose" .
It was noted by Collins J that the valuation tribunal did not purport to rely upon any evidence that the premises had at any time been altered, and there was nothing in its reasons to suggest that there was felt to be a need to be satisfied as to there having to be some alteration if the premises were to fall within the condition at !al in Class C. He said that the amendment to the regulations from 1 st April 1995, to require either a or b to be satisfied, served to emphasise the point.
The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the valuation tribunal holding the owner to be liable was set aside
LIABILITY OF OWNERS - 'HOUSES IN MULTIPLE OCCUPATION' -TENANTS HAVING RIGHT TO OCCUpy PART ONLY OF DWELLING - NOT LIABLE TO PAY RENT FOR WHOLE DWELLING
The appellants, here, were a charitable trust concerned with the leasing of domestic properties for occupation by homeless people, many of whom were unemployed. Each of the four properties concerned in the appeal was occupied by up to four people.
The billing authority considered the properties to be within the terms of Class C of the Council Tax [Liability for Owners) Regulations 1992 [see above], such that the Trust would be liable for the payment of council tax rather than the individual residents. The valuation tribunal upheld this view and found that, in accordance with paragraph [b) in Class C, each property was occupied by people who had a licence to occupy but were not liable to pay rent in respect of the dwelling as a whole.
The Trust appealed against the decision of the valuation tribunal and, in the High Court, Sullivan J firstly emphasised that the statutory right of appeal in cases such as this could only be made on a question of law. The valuation tribunal, he said, acted as the fact-finding authority, and the court could only intervene if it was found that the tribunal had erred in law upon the facts as it found them.
In its decision, as considered by the High Court, the valuation tribunal indicated that its conclusion had been arrived at on the basis of seven tenancy agreements, for periods later than those in question, which showed the weekly rents as being where four tenants were in occupation - £177.40, where three tenants were in occupation - £133.05, where two tenants were in occupation - £88.30.
The tribunal viewed this as evidence that the total rent for each dwelling, as shown in the agreements, varied according to the number of tenants.
A number of 'rental agreement forms' were then considered, and it was found that each of these was personal to an individual tenant and that each was in respect of a room, or rooms, in a shared house. These forms also confirmed individual shares of the weekly rent amounting to £44.35 per week, in contrast to the total rents appearing on the tenancy agreements, and showed in one particular case that the group of tenants in a dwelling had not taken occupation simultaneously.
The tribunal noted that after the death of one tenant in a unit of four occupants no one was held liable for that person's share of the total rent and that, ultimately, the rent was reduced from £177.40 to £133.05 per week. This, it was said, indicated that the weekly rent charges related to the number of tenants rather than to an actual rent for the whole dwelling. The tribunal considered that, on all the evidence, the tenancy agreements really comprised licences to occupy.
Counsel for the Trust submitted that the tribunal had erred in law in that it had looked at the rent that had actually been charged when it should have considered the question of liability. He argued out that the tenancy agreement created a tenancy, not a licence, and that the liability was to pay the whole of the rent in respect of the property, this being a liability jointly shared by all the tenants named in the tenancy agreements.
Sullivan J said that he was unable to accept counsel for the Trust's submission that, in considering the question of liability, the tribunal was, in effect, bound to focus simply upon the terms of the tenancy agreements and that it was not entitled to go further and look at what was actually happening "on the ground". He went on to say that, in his judgment, the tribunal was not bound to simply consider the tenancy agreements and was not bound by the terms in which the parties had chosen to express themselves in those agreements
Sullivan J added that, since the tenants were otherwise homeless and in many cases were unemployed, there was, in fact, no expectation that they would themselves pay the rents concerned. The expectation was, he said, that they would obtain housing benefit from the local authority, and he considered that that particular issue should not be ignored in deciding what weight to place upon the precise terms of the tenancy agreements.
Sullivan J declared himself satisfied that the tenancy agreements did not represent the true relationship between the parties identified in them, and he said that it was recognised by all of those involved that the true liability of the occupiers was in respect of that portion of the rent that related to their own rooms. He found that the valuation tribunal was entitled to come to that conclusion on the factual evidence before it, and that it was entitled to conclude that the occupation of the premises fell within paragraph (b) [ii] of Class C of the regulation.
The Trust's appeal against the decision of the valuation tribunal was dismissed.
CA: Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR, Buxton and Keene LJJ: 21 January 2004
To determine whether a property constituted a council taxpayer's sole or main residence for the purpose of ascertaining whether he was entitled to a discount on his council tax payments in respect of it, "residence" meant the place where the taxpayer actually resided.
Where he owned a property but did not live in it at all, he was not a resident for the purposes of s 6 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 and was therefore entitled to a discount in respect of it under s 11 of the Act.
The Court of Appeal so held, dismissing the appeal of Horsham District Council against the decision of McCombe J on 26 June 2003 to allow the appeal of the council taxpayer, Martin Williams, against the dismissal of the West Sussex Valuation Tribunal on 11 December 2002 of his appeal against the refusal of Horsham District Council to grant him a discount on his council tax liability in respect of a cottage he owned.
LORD PHILLIPS OF WORTH MATRAVERS MR, giving the judgment of the court, said that the taxpayer owned a cottage where he now lived in retirement. Between 1993 and 1996 he was employed as a housemaster at a college which provided him with a house where he lived with his wife.
The tribunal held that the taxpayer had to pay council tax on the cottage as their sole or main residence, whereas the taxpayer contended that their main residence at that time was the college's house.
The judge allowed the appeal holding that the tribunal had wrongly treated themselves as bound by case precedent to treat two of the relevant factors that they considered as of overriding importance.
Their Lordships stated that reference to decided cases might be of assistance in identifying factors relevant to the question of which was a person's "main residence", but because in a particular case one individual factor had been treated as of particular significance, it did not follow that it carried the same significance in a different factual scenario.
There was a more fundamental ground for challenging the tribunal's decision.
The issue before them was whether, during that period the cottage or the college house was their "main residence".
The starting point should have been to consider the meaning of that phrase. "Residence" was used as part of the definition of the word "resident".
The primary dictionary meaning of "resident" was "one who resides permanently in a place".
In s 6(5) of the Local Government Finance Act1992 "sole or main residence" referred to premises in which the taxpayer actually resided.
It was impossible to produce a definition of "main residence" that would provide the appropriate test in all circumstances. Usually, however, a main residence would be the dwelling that a reasonable onlooker with knowledge of the material facts would regard as that person's home at the material time.
Where a person, for a period, ceased to reside in the house that had been his sole or main residence, an issue might arise as to whether, during that period, the house in question ceased to be his sole or main residence. The answer would depend on the particular circumstances; it would be a matter of fact and degree.
Appearances: Jonathan Easton (Legal Department, Horsham District Council) for the council. Mr Williams in person.
The taxpayers, Miss Mullaney and Mr Clayton, each received a 25% single resident discount in respect of two separate dwellings. The Billing Authority removed Mr Clayton’s single resident discount and Miss Mullaney was awarded a 50% no resident discount for her dwelling on the basis that it was no person’s sole or main residence. The Valuation Tribunal dismissed Miss Mullaney’s and Mr Clayton’s appeals, thereby upholding the Billing Authority’s decision.
Miss Mullaney and Mr Clayton appealed to the High Court. Justice Scott Baker considered the evidence presented at the Tribunal hearing in relation to the issue of which of the two dwellings was Miss Mullaney’s main residence, including: early morning surveillance reports; benefit investigation officer’s meetings with Mr Clayton; and, location of Miss Mullaney’s possessions. The High Court dismissed Miss Mullaney’s and Mr Clayton’s appeals.
The appeals were concerned primarily with the issue of “sole or main residence”. However, the determination of sole or main residence had ramifications for the awarding of discounts to the taxpayers. A dwelling which is only one person’s sole or main residence will attract a 25% single resident discount; a dwelling which is no person’s sole or main residence may attract a 50% no resident discount.
