The following gives a list of a number of defences which may be available to the taxpayer.
Please note that this is not an exhaustive list but gives some of the main areas questioned during the life of Council Tax.
Not properly served or issued with documents. ENCON INSULATION LTD. v NOTTINGHAM CITY COUNCIL (1999)ENCON INSULATION LTD. v NOTTINGHAM CITY COUNCIL (1999)
ENCON INSULATION LTD. v NOTTINGHAM CITY COUNCIL (1999) – Demand Notice service
The premises involved in this case appeared in the local non-domestic rating list on 1st April 1990 as "Block B, Bloomsgrove Industrial Estate", but the billing authority failed to locate the property or identify its occupier until 7th November 1997. The authority then, on 14th November 1997, served demand notices on the occupiers for the periods from 1st April 1990 to 31st March 1998.
The ratepayers paid the amount due for the year 1997-98, but declined to pay anything for the previous periods. The authority ultimately made complaint with regard to the outstanding amount, and a liability order was issued by the magistrates’ court in April 1998. The ratepayers appealed to the High Court.
The case stated by the magistrates showed that they found as a fact that the ratepayer company had been the occupiers of the hereditament since 1988 and that an inspector employed by the billing authority had, on one occasion during the period in question, reported that he had been unable to locate this particular
property. It transpired that the premises were known to the occupiers as 17/19, Bloomsgrove Industrial Estate, and that they were unaware of the fact that the property appeared in the rating list as "Block B". The case stated further indicated that a representative of the billing authority had said that the delay in ascertaining the fact of the ratepayers’ occupation of the premises was "a very rare case which should have been picked up on earlier".
The justices concluded that the authority had served the demand notices as soon as practicable in the circumstances. Since it did not know the location or occupancy of the premises until 7th November 1997, they said, it was not feasible to serve the notices before that date.
Before the High Court, counsel for the ratepayers contended that the magistrates had erred in law in that they had focussed on whether the billing authority knew the location of the premises before 7th November 1997. The real issue, he said, was whether the authority had taken practical steps on or after 1st April in each relevant year to inform itself of the location of the premises. Alternatively, counsel
said, if the magistrates had asked themselves the right question, they had reached a perverse conclusion.
On behalf of the billing authority, counsel submitted that the case stated did show that the magistrates had considered whether it was practicable for the authority to have ascertained who the occupier was prior to November 1997, and that the magistrates had answered that question in the negative. He contended that the magistrates conclusions were at least open to them to make on the evidence.
Mr David Pannick QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, considered the dictionary definition of the word "practicable" as meaning being "capable of being carried out in action; feasible" or "possible to be accomplished with known means or known resources". He concluded that the magistrates did err in law in that issue was whether it was practicable for the billing authority to have identified the location of the premises at an earlier date and, therefore, to have served the notices at an earlier date.
Mr Pannick found that the magistrates had concentrated on the knowledge of the billing authority rather than on what the authority could earlier have discovered by taking practical steps. He did not accept the argument made for the billing authority that the magistrates had asked and answered the relevant question, and he considered that they ought to have focussed on the question of whether more could have been done, given that the inspector had not located the premises identified in the rating list. He emphasised that it was an authority’s statutory duty to ensure that demand notices are issued as soon as practicable.
Mr Pannick rejected the view that there were no practicable steps that the billing authority could and should have taken to identify the premises. There was no evidence, he said, that the authority had investigated the matter beyond the one occasion when the inspector had ultimately reported that he had been unable to locate the premises, and there was no evidence that the authority had made any enquiries of the valuation officer as to the whereabouts of the property shown in the rating list. The fact that the authority’s representative had conceded that the delay in ascertaining that the hereditament was occupied by the company was a rare case which should have been dealt with earlier was, in Mr Pannick’s opinion,
a recognition that there were practical steps which could have been taken.
It was found that the magistrates had failed to ask themselves the right question as to whether there were practicable steps that the billing authority could and should have taken before November 1997 to locate the premises. Mr Pannick said that he was satisfied that, if the justices had asked themselves the right question, the only answer to which they could reasonably have come was that there had been a breach of regulation 5(1)(a) of the 1989 regulations and that a liability order could not lawfully be made. He added that, in his view, Parliament must have intended that if a billing authority did not comply with this requirement of the law it would be wrong in principle for the ratepayer to have an obligation to pay.
It was held that the rates for the period in question were not payable, and the ratepayers’ appeal against the decision of the magistrates’ court to issue the liability order was allowed.
Council Tax not set properly.
The debt is being recovered more than 6 years after it became due. REGENTFORD LTD. v THANET DISTRICT COUNCIL (2004)REGENTFORD LTD. v THANET DISTRICT COUNCIL (2004)
REGENTFORD LTD. v THANET DISTRICT COUNCIL (2004) – Demand Notice Service
The appellant company in this case was served with demand notices on 2nd October 2002 for two properties it owned, which had been determined by the billing authority to be ‘houses in multiple occupation’, for periods from 1st April 1996 to 31st March 2003. No payment was made and, on 20th January 2003, the magistrates’ court issued liability orders in respect of the outstanding amounts.
The company did not attend the hearing of the billing authority’s application.
The company appealed against the justices’ decision and, in the High Court, Lightman J said that the point at issue was whether the sums claimed in respect of the particular year from 1st April 1996 to 31st March 1997 became due on 22nd February 1996, when the council tax was set, or on 2nd October 2002 when the
demand was made for their payment; the significance of this being the question of when the six year period of limitation on recovery action under regulation 19(1) of the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 begins to run.
The company submitted to the High Court that the duty to pay arose as soon as the billing authority exercised its power to set an amount of council tax and accordingly, that there was a debt due from the company on 22nd February 1996.
The authority, on the other hand, asserted that the whole scheme of the legislation is to draw a distinction between liability to council tax, in the sense of exposure to a possible duty to pay, and an actual duty to pay, and that the potential liability can only be triggered into an actual duty to pay by service of a demand for payment.
On this first issue, Lightman J agreed with the view of the billing authority and found that the liability to pay council tax required, for its transformation into a duty to pay, the service of a demand notice. Thus, in this case, the duty to pay council tax only arose on 2nd October 2002 when the notice was served in
accordance with regulation 18(1) and, accordingly, the full amounts of council tax were due when the liability orders were made. The justices, he said, had power to make those orders and they were valid and enforceable.
As to the further point regarding the obligation of the billing authority to serve a demand notice on every person liable ‘on or as soon as practicable’ after the day on which the council tax is set by the billing authority, Lightman J said that this statutory duty is imposed at least in substantial part for the protection of those from whom the authority may seek payment. The notice, he added, is required to enable the recipient to know that a claim may be made for payment and, so, to arrange his finances in order to make payment or, alternatively, to assemble evidence to demonstrate that there is no duty to pay.
Lightman J referred to the judgment in the rating case of Encon Insulation Ltd. V Nottingham City Council (1999), in which a default by the billing authority in taking steps available to them so as to issue a demand notice as soon as practicable precluded the recovery of the amounts concerned. He distinguished this from the present case, however, and said that the requirement in section 19(1) of the 1992 council tax regulations uses the words “is to be served” and this, he considered, admitted of the construction that a breach of the statutory duty “does not operate in all cases as a windfall to the person liable”.
Lightman J considered that a claim for payment, and a duty to pay, would only be precluded where the breach had occasioned some procedural or substantive prejudice. The appellant company in the present case had argued that the delay in sending the demand notices had occasioned prejudice in the sense that the records and information needed to establish that the properties were not in multiple occupation, and that others were resident there at the time, were no longer available. As to this, Lightman J said that there might well have been force in these submissions if the company had attended the hearing before the justices and had then presented them, but they had allowed the proceedings to go by default. He refused
the company’s application to remit the case to the justices for re-determination on this latter point, and he found that the justices had had jurisdiction to make the liability orders and that the council tax became due, when demanded, on 2nd October 2002.
The amount has been paid TOWER HAMLETS LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL v FALLOWS AND FALLOWS (1989)TOWER HAMLETS LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL v FALLOWS AND FALLOWS (1989)
Bankruptcy or Liquidation proceedings have commenced and debt is included. Insolvency Act 1986 as amended by the Insolvency Act 2000
Protection under Reserve and Aux. Forces (protection of Civil interests) Act 1951.
Administration order in force through the County Court Act 1984
Property not in area
Incorrect charge for band
Clerical/Computer error in banding
Allowance or relief not granted - Evans v Brook 1959
Out of time - Limitations Act 1980
Outstanding appeal against penalty ~ action taken against penalty amount as well as Council Tax
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 immunity
Crown Property
Amounts are not charged in accordance with any transitional arrangements (Council Tax Transitional Reduction Scheme)
Demand Notices not served as soon as practicable ENCON INSULATION LTD. v NOTTINGHAM CITY COUNCIL (1999)ENCON INSULATION LTD. v NOTTINGHAM CITY COUNCIL (1999)
ENCON INSULATION LTD. v NOTTINGHAM CITY COUNCIL (1999) – Demand Notice service
The premises involved in this case appeared in the local non-domestic rating list on 1st April 1990 as "Block B, Bloomsgrove Industrial Estate", but the billing authority failed to locate the property or identify its occupier until 7th November 1997. The authority then, on 14th November 1997, served demand notices on the occupiers for the periods from 1st April 1990 to 31st March 1998.
The ratepayers paid the amount due for the year 1997-98, but declined to pay anything for the previous periods. The authority ultimately made complaint with regard to the outstanding amount, and a liability order was issued by the magistrates’ court in April 1998. The ratepayers appealed to the High Court.
The case stated by the magistrates showed that they found as a fact that the ratepayer company had been the occupiers of the hereditament since 1988 and that an inspector employed by the billing authority had, on one occasion during the period in question, reported that he had been unable to locate this particular
property. It transpired that the premises were known to the occupiers as 17/19, Bloomsgrove Industrial Estate, and that they were unaware of the fact that the property appeared in the rating list as "Block B". The case stated further indicated that a representative of the billing authority had said that the delay in ascertaining the fact of the ratepayers’ occupation of the premises was "a very rare case which should have been picked up on earlier".
The justices concluded that the authority had served the demand notices as soon as practicable in the circumstances. Since it did not know the location or occupancy of the premises until 7th November 1997, they said, it was not feasible to serve the notices before that date.
Before the High Court, counsel for the ratepayers contended that the magistrates had erred in law in that they had focussed on whether the billing authority knew the location of the premises before 7th November 1997. The real issue, he said, was whether the authority had taken practical steps on or after 1st April in each relevant year to inform itself of the location of the premises. Alternatively, counsel
said, if the magistrates had asked themselves the right question, they had reached a perverse conclusion.
On behalf of the billing authority, counsel submitted that the case stated did show that the magistrates had considered whether it was practicable for the authority to have ascertained who the occupier was prior to November 1997, and that the magistrates had answered that question in the negative. He contended that the magistrates conclusions were at least open to them to make on the evidence.
Mr David Pannick QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, considered the dictionary definition of the word "practicable" as meaning being "capable of being carried out in action; feasible" or "possible to be accomplished with known means or known resources". He concluded that the magistrates did err in law in that issue was whether it was practicable for the billing authority to have identified the location of the premises at an earlier date and, therefore, to have served the notices at an earlier date.
Mr Pannick found that the magistrates had concentrated on the knowledge of the billing authority rather than on what the authority could earlier have discovered by taking practical steps. He did not accept the argument made for the billing authority that the magistrates had asked and answered the relevant question, and he considered that they ought to have focussed on the question of whether more could have been done, given that the inspector had not located the premises identified in the rating list. He emphasised that it was an authority’s statutory duty to ensure that demand notices are issued as soon as practicable.
Mr Pannick rejected the view that there were no practicable steps that the billing authority could and should have taken to identify the premises. There was no evidence, he said, that the authority had investigated the matter beyond the one occasion when the inspector had ultimately reported that he had been unable to locate the premises, and there was no evidence that the authority had made any enquiries of the valuation officer as to the whereabouts of the property shown in the rating list. The fact that the authority’s representative had conceded that the delay in ascertaining that the hereditament was occupied by the company was a rare case which should have been dealt with earlier was, in Mr Pannick’s opinion,
a recognition that there were practical steps which could have been taken.
It was found that the magistrates had failed to ask themselves the right question as to whether there were practicable steps that the billing authority could and should have taken before November 1997 to locate the premises. Mr Pannick said that he was satisfied that, if the justices had asked themselves the right question, the only answer to which they could reasonably have come was that there had been a breach of regulation 5(1)(a) of the 1989 regulations and that a liability order could not lawfully be made. He added that, in his view, Parliament must have intended that if a billing authority did not comply with this requirement of the law it would be wrong in principle for the ratepayer to have an obligation to pay.
It was held that the rates for the period in question were not payable, and the ratepayers’ appeal against the decision of the magistrates’ court to issue the liability order was allowed.
Incorrect Service of Summonses HUNKINS v COVENTRY MAGISTRATES’ COURT AND COVENTRY CITY COUNCIL (2004)HUNKINS v COVENTRY MAGISTRATES’ COURT AND COVENTRY CITY COUNCIL (2004)
The taxpayer in this case sought judicial review of the decision of the magistrates’ court to issue a liability order in respect of outstanding council tax. He contended that there had been a substantial irregularity in the procedures leading to that decision, in that, as he said, the billing authority had sought to obtain the liability order without first serving notice of proceedings upon him and this was contrary to natural justice.
The taxpayer did not appear before the High Court, but the billing authority gave evidence to show that no liability order was obtained against him on the date he had stated (i.e. 14th January 2004) and that the actual date on which the liability order was made was 9th June 2004. Munby J, in the High Court, concluded that that had been an error on the taxpayer’s part, and he chose to proceed on the
basis that the application was in relation to the order made on this latter date.
It was further submitted for the billing authority that its computer records, verified in evidence before the court, indicated that the taxpayer had attended the authority’s offices, with the summons, to complain about its having been issued. The taxpayer had chosen not to respond to this point, and Munby J said that this fact was consistent only with the summons having been received by him in the normal course of post.
Munby J said that, in these circumstances, the essential factual foundation for the case, namely that the proceedings before the magistrates were in breach of natural justice in that the matter was dealt with without the taxpayer being served, fell away. He consequently refused permission to move for judicial review, and he further vacated the stay on enforcement proceedings previously imposed on the authority by Ouseley J.
An outstanding CTB calculation will not stop recovery;
Liability orders were issued against two individuals in respect of unpaid amounts of community charge, notwithstanding their defence that, having submitted the appropriate application forms, they believed that they were entitled to community charge benefit which would have substantially reduced the amounts due.
The applications for benefit were submitted to the charging authority in January 1990 in one case and in October 1990 in the other. The latter application was not complete, since it did not contain the necessary proof of income.
At the time of the applications for liability orders, the authority was, in the first case, in breach of its statutory duty to determine benefit applications within 14 days, and the council acknowledged its failure in this respect. There was no such breach in the second case.
The chargepayers sought judicial review of the magistrates’ decision to issue the liability orders, but their applications were dismissed by the High Court on the grounds that -
(a) there was no express requirement that the demand should take account of claims for benefit which had not been determined;
(b) there was no provision that a person became entitled to benefit as soon as it was claimed and before the claim had been determined;
(c) the subsequent determination of the benefit applications and the backdating of the entitlement did not render the original demand invalid;
(d) the applicants’ claim that they had a legitimate expectation that the council would not seek a liability order while the benefit claim remained undetermined failed because the City Treasurer had informed the applicants of the risk they were running if they did not pay.
The decision of the High Court was subject to an appeal to the Court of Appeal.
In dismissing that appeal, the Court of Appeal, further, found that - (a) the magistrates were not only entitled, but were obliged, to make the liability orders;
(b) it was not unreasonable for the charging authority to proceed, given that it had made an undertaking not to enforce the liability orders (if granted) until the benefit claims were determined;
(c) the “doctrine of legitimate expectation” did not apply, because chargepayers receiving the documents from the council that they did could have had no such expectation that they were not bound to pay until their benefit was assessed, nor that the council would refrain from taking proceedings;
(d) a breach of a statutory duty is not, of itself, to be taken as a bar to proceedings, this being a factor to be weighed, with others, in testing the reasonableness of the council’s decision.
In this case, the magistrates’ court made a liability order against the taxpayer on 13th February 2001 in respect of an outstanding amount of £347 for the financial year 2000-2001. The matter had previously been adjourned by the justices in August 2000 so as to allow consideration of whether the taxpayer was entitled to council tax benefit.
The issues considered in the High Court included an assertion by the taxpayer that he had been entitled to council tax benefit in previous years and that he was so entitled for years after the year in question. In the particular year, however, his claim for benefit had been rejected by the billing authority, and he ultimately
made a complaint to the Local Government Ombudsman in this respect.
By February 2001, the Ombudsman had concluded that the billing authority had acted reasonably in dealing with the taxpayer’s benefit claim, and he found that the rejection of the claim was reasonable because the taxpayer had failed to supply proof of his receipt of certain benefits and pensions and that he had chosen not to provide such proof. The adjourned hearing of the billing authority’s application
then proceeded to be heard by the magistrates on 13th February 2001.
Before the justices, the taxpayer contended that the conclusion of the Ombudsman was unjustified, though he did not suggest that that conclusion was an inaccurate statement of what the Ombudsman had found. The billing authority’s representative gave evidence that the council tax had not been paid by the taxpayer, and he submitted that the court was obliged to make a liability order in these circumstances,
despite any pending claim for benefit. The justices accepted this view and made the liability order, notwithstanding the taxpayer’s request for a further adjournment The taxpayer’s case in the High Court was, again, that the conclusion of the Ombudsman regarding his benefit entitlement was unjustified, but he also asserted that the way he was treated in the magistrates’ court was unfair. He said that he had wanted a further adjournment so that he could pursue the question of why his benefit claim had been rejected, and that he had wanted access to records held by the billing authority and the appearance of a witness who could speak to those records so that that person could confirm that all the relevant documentation had been provided. Furthermore, he had wanted to call the Ombudsman in order to challenge the unfavourable conclusion that been had arrived at in his case.
Ouseley J, in the High Court, took the view that the reason that the magistrates were not prepared to go along with any of these points was that they had concluded that they were legally irrelevant to the issues which they had to decide, and that it would not be appropriate for court time to be spent considering them.
He said that the taxpayer, to succeed, had to show that the points he had been unable to raise in the magistrates’ court were points which would have been relevant to the making of the liability order.
Ouseley J went on to say that, in his judgment, the problem with the taxpayer’s claim was that it failed to recognise that that there are two distinct procedures to be followed, one dealing with the assessment of council tax benefit and the other dealing with council tax enforcement. The determination of liability by a
magistrates’ court, he said, does not involve the magistrates entering into an examination of whether a council taxpayer should or should not have had council tax benefit; their role was, in accordance with the statutory provisions, to consider whether the sum in question had become payable by the person and
whether it been paid.
Ouseley J concluded that it would not have been open to the magistrates to determine that the taxpayer ought to have had council tax benefit and, in consequence, to have declined to make the order, and he found that here had been no unfairness in the treatment that the taxpayer complained of, since the
magistrates were obliged to prevent him from seeking to argue on matters which had no relevance to the court’s decision. Ouseley J said that the taxpayer was entirely wrong in thinking that the magistrates were obliged to prevent a claim being made, and a liability order enforced, where there was an allegation that a
benefit claim had been unlawfully dealt with.
The taxpayer’s application for judicial review of the decision of the magistrates’ court was found to be ill founded and was dismissed.
If there is no valid defence the Liability Order should be granted.
(Reg 35 (6)) The court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid.
Liability Order Application for more than one year not a defence- TOWER HAMLETS LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL v MERRICK AND THAMES MAGISTRATES’ COURT (2001)TOWER HAMLETS LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL v MERRICK AND THAMES MAGISTRATES’ COURT (2001)
This appeal arose from a decision of the district judge, in the magistrates’ court, by which he dismissed the billing authority’s complaint, and rejected its application for a liability order, with regard to rates owed by the ratepayer for the years from 1997-98 to 2000-2001. The grounds upon which this decision was made, as set out in the case stated for consideration by the High Court, were that the district judge considered that it was not open to the billing authority to apply for a single liability order in respect of more than one year’s liability and that it would be unfair to include more than one year’s liability in a single liability order.
The billing authority contended, to the contrary, that it was entitled to seek a single liability order in respect of amounts payable for more than a year and that the district judge had no power to refuse to make such an order on the grounds of unfairness. The authority further argued that there was, in any event, no unfairness in the proceedings that it had initiated.
The ratepayer submitted to the High Court that the provision in regulation 4 (1) of the Non-Domestic Rating (Collection and Enforcement) (Local Lists) Regulations 1989 [see above] that there must be a different demand notice for different chargeable financial years established a principle by which separate procedures are required for each financial year. He went on to say that, in consequence, the reference to "a sum" in regulation 10 (2) of those regulations is to be understood as a sum due in respect of an individual financial year, and that the reference to "the sum" in regulation 12 (5), concerning the power of the magistrates to make a liability order, must be similarly construed.
Stanley Burnton J, in the High Court, referred to the power of the billing authority to take proceedings for recovery of rates in a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with regulation 10 (2), and pointed out that, in the absence of any express or implied restriction, Part 7.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules would enable a billing authority to include in the same proceedings liabilities for more than one year and resulting from the service of more than one demand notice. He then said that if ‘joinder of claims’ for more than one financial year is permissible in such proceedings in the county court or High Court, it would be difficult to see why the position should be different in proceedings for a liability order before the
magistrates’ court. Stanley Burnton J found support for the billing authority’s contention in regulation
11 (1), which provides that a reminder notice "is to state every amount in respect of which the authority is to make the application". This, he said, is an express provision that a reminder notice may state more than one amount, and this envisages that that the authority may make an application for a liability order
in respect of more than one amount. Further confirmation of the position was to be found in regulation 13, which enables the court to make a single liability order in respect of more than one person and more than one outstanding amount.
Turning to the ratepayer’s argument, Stanley Burnton J said that the ratepayer’s real complaint was that the liability in respect of each year needed to be considered separately by the magistrates’ court and that the inclusion of several year’s amounts in one complaint and one summons would hinder his defence. Stanley Burnton J rejected this view, however, and said that that was no difference between the issues which could be taken by a defendant who is the subject of separate complaints in relation to each year’s rates and one who is the subject of a single complaint relating to several year’s rates.
Stanley Burnton J emphasised that regulation 12 (5) required the magistrates’ court to make the order if it is satisfied that the sum in question has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid. He said that, in the light of this, it is not open to the court to refuse to make an order, in respect of any sum which
it is satisfied has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid, only on the ground that the complaint or the summons relates to more than one year. It was held that that it was open to the billing authority to make application for a single liability order to include more than one financial year’s liability, and that the magistrates’ court, in the circumstances of this case, had no discretion to make individual liability orders in respect of each financial year’s liability. Further, by virtue of regulation 12, the court was obliged, in circumstances of this kind, to make an order in respect of the total sum outstanding for the years in question, plus the billing authority’s reasonable costs in obtaining the liability order.
The case was remitted to the magistrates’ court for reconsideration.
Rv HACKNEY LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL EX PARTE ADEBIRIRv HACKNEY LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL EX PARTE ADEBIRI;
Application for judicial review was here made in respect of the decisions of three billing authorities to institute recovery proceedings against individuals who were asylum seekers but who had had their applications for asylum refused. The applicants were entitled to remain in the United Kingdom pending the determination of their appeals against this refusal.
The applicants were originally in receipt of income support, but this ceased when their applications for asylum were rejected. Two of them thereafter received assistance from the local authority pursuant to section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948, and the others, in view of their having dependent children,
had their rent paid and received payments from the local authority in accordance with section 17 of the Children Act 1989.
Before the High Court, counsel for the applicants argued that the various stages in the council tax enforcement process all gave discretion to the billing authority, and that it was a wrong exercise of that discretion to take any of the recovery steps against persons who were known to be in no position to meet their liability. This was particularly so, it was said, in the case of asylum seekers.
Counsel went on to assert that at each stage the authority must have a reasonable suspicion that the debtor has the means to pay or has failed to pay as the result of wilful refusal or culpable neglect. He said that the authorities had possessed information as to the applicants’ difficult financial situation from the
outset, and that the failure to consider this demonstrated that there had been no assessment of the merits of the individual cases before each of the decisions were made.
It was further submitted that none of the three billing authorities had a policy which dealt with the unique situation of destitute asylum seekers or which recognised the fact that an asylum seeker succeeding in his or her appeal could be entitled to retrospective council tax benefit from the date of notice of appeal.
Counsel argued that such a provision must envisage that no enforcement action would be taken pending the appeal.
Counsel said that the enforcement proceedings were, in any event, ultra vires because they had been brought against persons not within the contemplation of the regulations, in that the applicants were not “those who earn money, have money, have property or receive state benefits”. He sought leave to make a final point, raised only on the last day before the hearing, that in the case of the two individuals receiving assistance under section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948, their accommodation was, effectively, provided under that provision and liability should thus fall upon the owner in accordance with Class A of the Council Tax (Liability for Owners) Regulations 1992.
Kay J, in the High Court, firstly found a difficulty in seeking to reconcile counsel’s argument that the regulations only contemplated enforcement action being taken against people with resources. He pointed to the magistrates’ power to remit, and he said that it was clear that Parliament had had in mind that proceedings might be taken against those who were in no position to meet their liability and had therefore “provided a way in which injustice could be avoided”.
As to the question of whether the owner should be liable instead of the two tenants in respect of the accommodation they lived in, Kay J said that there was a question as to whether the discharge of rental payments under existing tenancies necessarily meant that the accommodation was “provided under section 21” of the 1948 Act. Since this ground had been raised only just before the hearing, and since neither the authorities concerned nor the owners of the properties had had an opportunity to consider this question, Kay J refused leave to amend the applications to reflect this point.
Kay J said that the decision under challenge in each case was the decision of the billing authority to make application to the magistrates’ court for the issue of a liability order. He then rejected the submission that the taking of proceedings to enforce liability was in any way ultra vires as regards the council tax regulations and the law governing asylum and immigration. He found no implication in the law that billing
authorities should not exercise their powers pending the hearing of an asylum appeal and concluded that the ultimate safeguard was the requirement for the magistrates to consider whether there is wilful refusal or culpable neglect to pay.
It was the view of Kay J that it was impossible to say that the billing authorities initial step of seeking a liability order was unreasonable. That stage, he said, did no more than enable the precise liability to be established, and a liability order then enabled the authority to keep itself informed by making requests for information that the debtor is obliged to answer.
Kay J saw no proper basis for saying that either the challenged decisions or the underlying policies given effect by the authorities were unreasonable or wrong in law. He accordingly refused to quash the decisions of the billing authorities and dismissed the applications.
Application for judicial review was here made in respect of the decisions of three billing authorities to institute recovery proceedings against individuals who were asylum seekers but who had had their applications for asylum refused. The applicants were entitled to remain in the United Kingdom pending the determination of their appeals against this refusal.
The applicants were originally in receipt of income support, but this ceased when their applications for asylum were rejected. Two of them thereafter received assistance from the local authority pursuant to section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948, and the others, in view of their having dependent children,
had their rent paid and received payments from the local authority in accordance with section 17 of the Children Act 1989.
Before the High Court, counsel for the applicants argued that the various stages in the council tax enforcement process all gave discretion to the billing authority, and that it was a wrong exercise of that discretion to take any of the recovery steps against persons who were known to be in no position to meet their liability. This was particularly so, it was said, in the case of asylum seekers.
Counsel went on to assert that at each stage the authority must have a reasonable suspicion that the debtor has the means to pay or has failed to pay as the result of wilful refusal or culpable neglect. He said that the authorities had possessed information as to the applicants’ difficult financial situation from the
outset, and that the failure to consider this demonstrated that there had been no assessment of the merits of the individual cases before each of the decisions were made.
It was further submitted that none of the three billing authorities had a policy which dealt with the unique situation of destitute asylum seekers or which recognised the fact that an asylum seeker succeeding in his or her appeal could be entitled to retrospective council tax benefit from the date of notice of appeal.
Counsel argued that such a provision must envisage that no enforcement action would be taken pending the appeal.
Counsel said that the enforcement proceedings were, in any event, ultra vires because they had been brought against persons not within the contemplation of the regulations, in that the applicants were not “those who earn money, have money, have property or receive state benefits”. He sought leave to make a final point, raised only on the last day before the hearing, that in the case of the two individuals receiving assistance under section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948, their accommodation was, effectively, provided under that provision and liability should thus fall upon the owner in accordance with Class A of the Council Tax (Liability for Owners) Regulations 1992.
Kay J, in the High Court, firstly found a difficulty in seeking to reconcile counsel’s argument that the regulations only contemplated enforcement action being taken against people with resources. He pointed to the magistrates’ power to remit, and he said that it was clear that Parliament had had in mind that proceedings might be taken against those who were in no position to meet their liability and had therefore “provided a way in which injustice could be avoided”.
As to the question of whether the owner should be liable instead of the two tenants in respect of the accommodation they lived in, Kay J said that there was a question as to whether the discharge of rental payments under existing tenancies necessarily meant that the accommodation was “provided under section 21” of the 1948 Act. Since this ground had been raised only just before the hearing, and since neither the authorities concerned nor the owners of the properties had had an opportunity to consider this question, Kay J refused leave to amend the applications to reflect this point.
Kay J said that the decision under challenge in each case was the decision of the billing authority to make application to the magistrates’ court for the issue of a liability order. He then rejected the submission that the taking of proceedings to enforce liability was in any way ultra vires as regards the council tax regulations and the law governing asylum and immigration. He found no implication in the law that billing
authorities should not exercise their powers pending the hearing of an asylum appeal and concluded that the ultimate safeguard was the requirement for the magistrates to consider whether there is wilful refusal or culpable neglect to pay.
It was the view of Kay J that it was impossible to say that the billing authorities initial step of seeking a liability order was unreasonable. That stage, he said, did no more than enable the precise liability to be established, and a liability order then enabled the authority to keep itself informed by making requests for information that the debtor is obliged to answer.
Kay J saw no proper basis for saying that either the challenged decisions or the underlying policies given effect by the authorities were unreasonable or wrong in law. He accordingly refused to quash the decisions of the billing authorities and dismissed the applications.
Application for judicial review was here made in respect of the decisions of three billing authorities to institute recovery proceedings against individuals who were asylum seekers but who had had their applications for asylum refused. The applicants were entitled to remain in the United Kingdom pending the determination of their appeals against this refusal.
The applicants were originally in receipt of income support, but this ceased when their applications for asylum were rejected. Two of them thereafter received assistance from the local authority pursuant to section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948, and the others, in view of their having dependent children,
had their rent paid and received payments from the local authority in accordance with section 17 of the Children Act 1989.
Before the High Court, counsel for the applicants argued that the various stages in the council tax enforcement process all gave discretion to the billing authority, and that it was a wrong exercise of that discretion to take any of the recovery steps against persons who were known to be in no position to meet their liability. This was particularly so, it was said, in the case of asylum seekers.
Counsel went on to assert that at each stage the authority must have a reasonable suspicion that the debtor has the means to pay or has failed to pay as the result of wilful refusal or culpable neglect. He said that the authorities had possessed information as to the applicants’ difficult financial situation from the
outset, and that the failure to consider this demonstrated that there had been no assessment of the merits of the individual cases before each of the decisions were made.
It was further submitted that none of the three billing authorities had a policy which dealt with the unique situation of destitute asylum seekers or which recognised the fact that an asylum seeker succeeding in his or her appeal could be entitled to retrospective council tax benefit from the date of notice of appeal.
Counsel argued that such a provision must envisage that no enforcement action would be taken pending the appeal.
Counsel said that the enforcement proceedings were, in any event, ultra vires because they had been brought against persons not within the contemplation of the regulations, in that the applicants were not “those who earn money, have money, have property or receive state benefits”. He sought leave to make a final point, raised only on the last day before the hearing, that in the case of the two individuals receiving assistance under section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948, their accommodation was, effectively, provided under that provision and liability should thus fall upon the owner in accordance with Class A of the Council Tax (Liability for Owners) Regulations 1992.
Kay J, in the High Court, firstly found a difficulty in seeking to reconcile counsel’s argument that the regulations only contemplated enforcement action being taken against people with resources. He pointed to the magistrates’ power to remit, and he said that it was clear that Parliament had had in mind that proceedings might be taken against those who were in no position to meet their liability and had therefore “provided a way in which injustice could be avoided”.
As to the question of whether the owner should be liable instead of the two tenants in respect of the accommodation they lived in, Kay J said that there was a question as to whether the discharge of rental payments under existing tenancies necessarily meant that the accommodation was “provided under section 21” of the 1948 Act. Since this ground had been raised only just before the hearing, and since neither the authorities concerned nor the owners of the properties had had an opportunity to consider this question, Kay J refused leave to amend the applications to reflect this point.
Kay J said that the decision under challenge in each case was the decision of the billing authority to make application to the magistrates’ court for the issue of a liability order. He then rejected the submission that the taking of proceedings to enforce liability was in any way ultra vires as regards the council tax regulations and the law governing asylum and immigration. He found no implication in the law that billing
authorities should not exercise their powers pending the hearing of an asylum appeal and concluded that the ultimate safeguard was the requirement for the magistrates to consider whether there is wilful refusal or culpable neglect to pay.
It was the view of Kay J that it was impossible to say that the billing authorities initial step of seeking a liability order was unreasonable. That stage, he said, did no more than enable the precise liability to be established, and a liability order then enabled the authority to keep itself informed by making requests for information that the debtor is obliged to answer.
Kay J saw no proper basis for saying that either the challenged decisions or the underlying policies given effect by the authorities were unreasonable or wrong in law. He accordingly refused to quash the decisions of the billing authorities and dismissed the applications.
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